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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last several years, considerable public and government attention has 
been directed to the acquisition of Western strategic technology by potential 
military adversaries of the United States, particularly the Soviet Union.! Con-
fronted by the Eastern bloc's overwhelming superiority in manpower and sheer 
volume of weaponry, Western security is dependent on advanced technology. 
Congressional studies and intelligence reports have identified a significant Soviet 
effort to satisfy the immediate demands of its military structure.2 As Senator 
William Roth has declared: 
There is no question that the Soviets have undertaken a massive, 
well-financed, expertly coordinated program to systematically ac-
quire as much [of] our high technology as they can steal, purchase 
through middlemen or otherwise appropriate. And all because they 
are unable to produce that technology themselves. So they are left to 
copy ours and use it, [not] to make life more comfortable for their 
citizens, but to advance their numerous weapons systems and overall 
military capabilities.3 
The primary emphasis of the Western response to this threat is on the control 
of exports of goods. As enforcement efforts are increased and improved, further 
study has been given to the extent to which the acquisition of technical informa-
t The analysis and conclusions included in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the official views of the Department of Justice. 
* Deputy Counsel to the Attorney General for Intelligence Policy, U.S. Department of Justice. 
** Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
1. See, e.g., Transfer of United States High Technology to the SoviLt Union and SoviLt Bloc Nations: Hearings 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 193-216 (1982) (statement of William von Raab, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service Regarding 
Operation EXODUS) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings). 
2. See SENATE COMM. ON GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REpORT ON TRANSFER OF UNITED STATES HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND SOVIET BLOC NATIONS, S. REp. No. 664, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
32 (1982). 
3. Id. at 1. 
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tion contributes to the diminution of the West's technologicallead.4 Knowledge-
able parties have urged that control-mechanisms should be focused on techno-
logical "know-how" and manufacturing information, as opposed to end-
products, since the adaptation and application of such information will have the 
most enduring impact on military and industrial capabilities.5 Others, while not 
disagreeing with that assessment, counsel caution in devising controls on infor-
mation which may exceed the scope of the problem and have the unintended 
and undesirable effect of constraining scientific and academic communication 
and impeding our own technological advancement.6 
This paper provides brief, essentially nontechnical, summaries of the legal 
mechanisms which authorize the U.S. government to control the communication 
of technical information that might improve the military capabilities of its poten-
tial adversaries.7 
II. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
Existing laws and regulations provide authority for government control of 
technical information that is under the control of the government or that is in 
private hands and has certain identifiable applications. These laws and regula-
tions do not provide the government with general authority to control privately 
developed technical information that appears to have no practical military or 
industrial value. 
Given the high rate of technological advancement in the private sector, techni-
cal information of no apparent practical application today may be the basis for a 
revolutionary breakthrough (usually identified as an "emerging technology") in 
the near future. s Nonetheless, it would be nearly impossible, as has been ac-
knowledged impliedly in the current control structure, to attempt to control all 
information that has uncertain practical value. Accordingly, this discussion 
4. See, e.g., id. at 235-49 (testimony of Adm. Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence); see also, COMMITTEE ON ScIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PuBLIC POLICY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ScIENCES, SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY, (1982) (Report of the Panel on 
Scientific Communication and National Security) [hereinafter cited as SCIENTIFIC CoMMUNICATION AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY]. 
5. See, e.g., Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, 
February 1976. 
6. [d.; see also ScIENTIFIC CoMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 4; T. GUSTAFSON, 
SELLING THE RUSSIANS THE ROPE? SoVIET TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND U.S. EXPORT CoNTROLS (1981) 
(Rand Corp. Study for the Defense, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Santa Monica, CAl. 
7. This paper does not address technical information that may be classified as national security 
information under Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). Rather, it assumes that 
technical information produced by or for the U.S. government that may and should be classified will be 
identified and controlled on that basis. The subject of this paper is technical information that the 
government has not classified or that is not in the possession or control of the U.S. government and, 
therefore, cannot be classified. 
8. See Senate Hearings, supra note I, at 262-77 (testimony of Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Secretary for 
Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce). 
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focuses on what we have called "development information," as differentiated 
from "research information" that exists primarily to foster further study. 
"Research information," for purposes of this paper, is defined as the product 
of systematic study and experimentation intended to improve understanding of 
fundamental phenomena. Such information is not developed for specific com-
mercial or military uses, but is pursued primarily to increase human knowledge. 
The process by which such information is produced is often referred to as 
"basic" or "fundamental" research. "Development information" is defined for 
purposes of this paper as the product of systematic design, fabrication, or 
experimental efforts to translate an application concept into specifications, mod-
els, or design data necessary for the effective production of a product or the 
effective use of a process. This category of information is generically identified 
as "technical data" in the most important current control mechanisms.9 
In addition to defining the basic types of information that are discussed here, 
it is necessary also to define several terms that are used to determine when 
information that is otherwise within the scope of the control mechanisms will 
not be subject to further controls because of its widespread availability. Informa-
tion is "published" when it is made available in tangible form to any person 
through purchase, free distribution, or public libraries. Mere submission to a 
publisher or editor does not, however, constitute publication. lo Information is 
"publicly available" in the context of this paper when it has been published, 
approved for public release by the department or agency that has responsibility 
for the information, or disclosed at a conference, trade show, or other meeting 
that is open to the pu blic. 11 "Open to the pu blic," as used here, means the event 
may be attended by technically qualified members of the public (subject only to 
administrative considerations such as space limitations and payment of registra-
tion fees) and it is expected that conference proceedings, reports, or the like will 
be published in the reasonably foreseeable futureY 
Ill. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR CONTROL OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
The three primary sources of authority for U.S. government controls over the 
communication of "development information" are: (a) the Export Administration 
9. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 379.I(a) (1983); International Traffic In Arms 
Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1983). As is explained later in this paper, these regulations identify the 
technical information that is subject to government controls by its setting on the continuum between 
pure research and full-scale production. Although necessary in practice, this approach presents a 
fundamental dilemma since the conceptual basis for controlling the export of the information is not the 
context in which it appears but the nature of the information and its perceived value. 
10. Cf Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 379.3(a) (1983) (for definition of "'Data 
Generally Available"). 
11. CI id.; 22 C.F.R. §§ 125.11-.12 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
12. /d. 
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Act of 1979,13 and its implementing regulations,14 for information having both 
civilian and military applications; (b) the Arms Export Control Act,15 and its 
implementing regulations,16 for information pertaining solely to defense articles 
and defense services; and (c) the Atomic Energy Act, 17 for information relating 
to nuclear materials, weapons, and applications. 
Other sources of authority are applicable in particular circumstances. The 
Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 and its regulationsl8 may be the basis for a secrecy 
order in instances where technical information contained in a patent application 
requires controls for national security purposes. Additional sources of special-
ized authority include the Trading With the Enemy Act and its regulationsl9 and 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).20 The former 
statute is applicable generally in commercial dealings with specific, previously 
designated foreign countries, while the latter statute requires a declaration of 
national emergency for its invocation.21 
The Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act are applied 
at present through their implementing regulations to cover only "development 
information" rather than "research information."22 The Atomic Energy Act 
applies not only to development information that relates to atomic energy and 
nuclear materials, but also to research information, since such information is of 
manifest practical value.23 The Trading With the Enemy Act and the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act also may apply to both types of informa-
tion when they appear in a commercial context.24 The Invention Secrecy Act, by 
its nature, contemplates practical application since it applies to information 
included in a patent application.25 
13 .. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). 
14. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368.1-399.1 (1983). 
15. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1982). 
16.22 C.F.R. §§·121.01-130.33 (1983). 
17.42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982). 
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1982); 37 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-.23 (1983). 
19. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982 & Supp. I 1983); 31 C.F.R. § 500.101-520.809 (1983). 
20. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. 1983) (IEEPA). 
21. The IEEPA was invoked in a variety of contexts to deal with the Iranian hostage crisis. Exec. 
Order Nos. 12,170,44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979); 12,205,45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980); 12,211,45 Fed. 
Reg. 26,685 (1980); 12,276-12,284,46 Fed. Reg. 7,913-31 (1981); 12,307,46 Fed. Reg. 30,483 (1981); 
12,317,46 Fed. Reg. 42,241 (1981); 12,379,47 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (1982). More recently, IEEPA has been 
invoked in Exec. Order No. 12,444,48 Fed. Reg. 48,215 (1983), which extended the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations for several weeks between the expiration of the Export Administration Act and its 
extension by Congress through February, 1984, and again in Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 
13,099 (1984) when the congressional extension expired. 
22. See supra note 9. 
23. See supra note 17. 
24. See supra notes 19 and 20. 
25. See supra note 18. 
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A. Export Administration Act and Export Administration Regulations 
The Export Administration Act (EAA),26 which is administered by the Com-
merce Department,27 encompasses a broad range of "development informa-
tion," identified in this context as "technology" or "technical data."28 The statu-
tory language demonstrates that Congress contemplated export controls of 
certain types of information as well as hardware and equipment, since the statute 
refers repeatedly to control of both "goods [and/or] technology,"29 and "technol-
ogy" is defined to include a variety of information of practical value, including 
technical data.3u 
The Secretary of Commerce maintains the Commodity Control List (CCL) 
which identifies the "goods" and "technology" that are subject to the licensing 
requirements of the EAA.31 The "technology" that is subject to EAA controls is 
defined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) as technical data "that 
can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, production, manufacture, utiliza-
tion, or reconstruction of articles or materials" without reference to whether those 
articles or materials are themselves included on the CCL.32 This information 
may be in tangible form, such as blueprints or manuals, or may be conveyed by 
intangible means, such as by the provision of technical services.33 
The 1979 revision of the EAA required the Defense Department to develop a 
list of technologies considered to be militarily "critical."34 This list was to be 
prepared for incorporation in the Commodity Control List, thereby facilitating 
control of these "militarily critical" technologies.3s This process has not been 
completed to date, although DOD has published a "Table of Contents" for the 
list. 36 
The EAA authorizes export controls for three basic purposes: (a) to protect 
U.S. national security interests, (b) to further U.S. foreign policy objectives, and 
(c) to protect the U.S. economy by limiting the export of materials that are in 
short supply domestically.37 The national security controls are the most impor-
tant of the three for purposes of this discussion, since they may be applied to any 
transfer of technology that would make a significant contribution to the military 
26. Set 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(4) (19828< Supp. I 1983). 
27. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2409. 2411. 2415(5) (1982 8< Supp. I 1983). 
28. 15 C.F.R. § 379.I(a) (1983). 
29. Ste ••. g .• 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(5). 2401(8). 2402(2). 2402(6) (1982 8< Supp. I 1983). 
30. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(4) (1982 8< Supp. I 1983). 
31. [d. § 2403(b) (1982 8< Supp. I 1983). 
32. 15 C.F.R. § 379.I(a) (1983). 
33. [d. 
34. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (19828< Supp. I 1983). 
35. [d. § 2404(d)(3)-(d)(5) (19828< Supp. I 1983). 
36. 45 Fed. Reg. 65.014 (1980). The Department of Energy also published a "Ust of Energy Related 
Militarily Critical Technologies" in support of the DOD effort. 45 Fed. Reg. 65.152 (1980). 
37. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (19828< Supp. I 1983). 
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potential of any country that would be detrimental to the national security of the 
United States.38 The Export Administration Regulations extend this authority to 
any person or technology within the jurisdiction of the United States39 and 
restrict exports of technical data from the United States, reexports of U.S.-
originated technical data from one foreign destination to another, and exports 
or reexports between foreign destinations of foreign materials that incorporate 
U.S.-originated technical data. 40 
Any transfer of "development information" that falls within these broad 
controls over technical data requires a validated, i.e., specifically approved 
license, except to the extent that the EAR provide a general license, i.e., no 
specific approval required for transfers of publicly available, scientific or educa-
tional data, or for transfers to certain destinations. 41 Since the EAR controls of 
technical data are broader than those concerning goods, there may be circum-
stances where a license would be required for the export of "development 
information" even though no license would be required for the export of goods 
produced by that technology. This conclusion is based on the fact that technol-
ogy relating to nonmilitary commodities that are uncontrolled may be useful for 
the production of military materials. 
"Export" is defined in the EAR to include not only any actual transmission of 
"development information" out of the United States, but also any release of such 
information in the United States with knowledge or intent that the information 
will be transmitted out of the United States or any release abroad of such 
information that originated in the United States. 42 Such release of information 
may take the form of visual inspection of equipment or facilities by foreign 
nationals, oral exchanges in the United States or abroad, or the application 
abroad of knowledge or experience acquired in the United States.43 
A broad definition of "technical data" thus is combined with a broad definition 
of "export" to require, with very few exceptions, a license for virtually any 
disclosures to foreign nationals in the United States or any transmission or use 
abroad of most "development information." As mentioned, the EAA and EAR 
contemplate two basic types of licenses: "general" and "validated." The broad 
authority asserted by the expansive definitions in the EAR is made less burden-
some through the creation of general licenses. These licenses have the character 
of regulatory exemptions and generally require no formal application or notice 
38. !d. § 2402(A). 
39. The jurisdiction of the United States may reach persons and information outside the United 
States, its possessions, and territories. See id. §§ 2404(a), 2415(2); 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.I(b), 379.I(c), 379.8 
(1983). 
40. 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.I(b), 379.I(c) (1983). 
41. !d. §§ 370.3(a), 379.2-379.6. 
42. Id. § 379.I(b)(1). 
43. !d. § 379(b)(2). 
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to the Department of Commerce, so long as the export of the technical data in 
question meets the standards articulated in the EAR. 
One type of general license permits any export of "development informa-
tion"44 that has been made generally available to the public in any form. This 
concept of public availability includes oral or visual release at "open" confer-
ences, lectures, trade shows, and in publications that are free or available without 
restriction for the cost of publication rather than the commercial value of the 
data or are readily available at libraries open to the public.45 While there is little 
administrative guidance available on the subject, an "open" conference could be 
characterized as one that features advance announcement or other notice that 
indicates the session is known and may be attended by any technically qualified 
members of the public, subject to administrative considerations such as space 
limitations and the payment of registration fees, and an intent that proceedings, 
reports, or the like will be published and readily available in connection with the 
conference. 
A general license also permits release of scientific or educational information 
that is not directly and significantly related to the design, production, or utiliza-
tion of industrial processes: "research information."46 Authority is also provided 
for academic classroom or laboratory instruction involving such information so 
long as the su bject is not contract research directly and significantly related to 
industrial purposes or processes: "development information."47 Limited general 
license authority is also available in certain situations involving U.S. or foreign 
patent applications.48 
The second type of general license that is provided in the EAR for the transfer 
of "development information" is more limited and depends on the nature of the 
information and its intended destination.49 Generally, the export of such infor-
mation relating to nonmilitary industrial processes to Free World countries is 
permitted, although in some cases the recipient must provide written assurance 
that the data will not be reexported.50 This license is not available where there is 
reason to believe the data is related to certain identified products or processes.51 
Except for transfers to Canada, where most types of information may be sent 
without a license of any type,52 any transfer of "development information" that is 
directly related to an item on the Commodity Control List, or is directly and 
significantly related to any industrial process, requires a validated license for 
44. Id. § 379.3(a). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. § 379.3(b)(I). 
47. /d. § 379.3(b)(2). 
48. Id. § 379.3(c). 
49. Id. § 379.4. 
50. Id. § 379.8. 
51. Id. § 379.4(c). 
52. Id. § 379.2. n. 7. 
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export to countries to which exports are controlled for national security pur-
poses.53 Such licenses require the approval of the Department of Commerce.54 
Where the information in question has been developed in whole or in part as a 
direct or indirect result of Department of Defense funding, the approval of the 
Department of Defense may also be necessary.55 
As noted above, information of whatever nature, whether "research" or "de-
velopment," is not subject to the EAA and EAR formal validated licensing 
requirements if it has been made "publicly available."56 This means that the 
information has been made available in the public media, is available at public 
libraries, or is available for merely the cost of its publication rather than its 
intrinsic value.57 The EAR apparently presumes that the owners of commercially 
valuable information will, in effect, identify the information requiring license 
approval for its transfer by their efforts to protect it. 
B. Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA)58 provides the legal authority to con-
trol the transfer of articles and services that have direct military application. 
While the statute does not provide expressly that "information," such as "techni-
cal data" as defined in the EAR, is included within the meaning of the terms 
"defense services" or "defense articles," the language of the act is sufficiently 
broad to authorize controls over this area.59 This authority, administered by the 
Department of State, is implemented by the International Traffic In Arms 
Regulations (IT AR).60 Those articles and services for which a license is required 
prior to exportation are designated in the IT AR's U.S. Munitions List, by the 
Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.61 
Unlike the EAA and EAR controls, which differ depending upon the particu-
lar destination to which the controlled technology is being exported, the AECA 
and IT AR control the export of defense-related materials and technical data, as 
well as classified information, to all foreign destinations. All exports of such 
items to certain countries are prohibited as a matter of national security policy.62 
The U.S. Munitions List, like the Commodity Control List, controls "technical 
53. Id. § 379.5(a). 
54.Id. 
55. Id. §§ 370.10, 379.1(b) n.4. 
56. Id. § 379.3(a). 
57.Id. 
58. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1982). 
59. Id. §§ 2403(e), 2778, 2794(4) &: (7). 
60. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.01-122.22 (1983). 
61. 22 U.S.C. I 2778 (1982); Exec. Order No. 11,958, § l(e), 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1977), as amentkd by 
Exec. Order No. 12,118,44 Fed. Reg. 7939 (1979). 
62. 22 C.F.R. II 123.01; 123.10, 126.01 (1983).' 
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data" related to items on the list.63 Although slightly different from the defini-
tion in the EAR, the IT AR definition of "technical data" is equally broad. 
Generally, the IT AR definition also applies to "development" rather than "re-
search" information. The definition includes classified information relating to 
items on the U.S. Munitions List, but also: 
[a]ny unclassified information that can be used, or be adapted for use, in 
the design, production, manufacture, repair, overhaul, processing, en-
gineerign, development, operation, maintenance, or reconstruction of arms, 
ammunition, and implements of war on the U.S. Munitions List; or (b) 
any technology which advances the state-of-the-art or establishes a new art in 
an area of significant military applicability in the United States; ... 64 
With respect to subpart (b) of this definition, the exporter has the specific duty to 
consult with appropriate U.S. government officials and to determine whether 
the technical data in question "advances the state-of-the-art or establishes a new 
art."65 
These provisions may be applicable to "research information" or "emerging 
technologies" if "state-of-the-art" is intended to include any new information in 
any area that may have military significance. The reference in subpart (b) of the 
definition to "significant military applicability," however, seems to imply practical 
use and may serve to exclude information that is not "development informa-
tion." 
The IT AR controls on technical data apply whether the information is dis-
closed orally, visually, or by documentary means.66 The regulations apply 
whether the information in question is transmitted out of the United States by 
human or other means, whether the "export" occurs in the course of visits or 
participation in conferences and trade fairs abroad by U.S. citizens, or by visits or 
participation in conferences and trade fairs in the United States by foreign 
nationals.67 
As with the EAA and EAR, regulatory exemptions narrow the expansive reach 
of these IT AR provisions. Under the IT AR, however, the format of the exemp-
tions is to require no license in certain circumstances, rather than to create a 
general license requiring no formal application or review. 68 Several limited 
exemptions may be relevant in particular situations. For example, most un-
classified information may be exported to Canada,69 and no license is required to 
ship additional copies of information previously exported to the same recipient 
63. [d. § 121.01, id. § 125.01-125.24. 
64. [d. § 125.01(a) (1983) (emphasis added). 
65. [d. § 125.oI n.1. 
66. [d. § 125.03. 
67. [d. §§ 125.03, 125.04(c). 
68. [d. §§ 125.11, 125.12. 
69. [d. § 125.12. 
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under a license. 7o An important exemption provides that no license is necessary 
for the export of "technical data" t,hat is "in published form and subject to public 
dissemination."71 This exemption includes information that is: "(a) sold at news-
stands and bookstores; (b) available without charge or by subscription or pur-
chase to any person without further restriction; (c) determined to be eligible for 
second-class mailing privileges; or (d) freely available at public libraries."72 
As under the EAR, these provisions apparently embody an assumption that 
persons or entities in possession of information will act in their commercial 
self-interest to identify that information which is valuable and worthy of protec-
tion. Unlike the EAR, however, the ITAR provide that persons seeking to 
publish "technical data," whether or not developed under contract with the 
government, have the burden of obtaining appropriate U.S. government ap-
proval. 73 This IT AR requirement seems to require an export license in order to 
publish "development information" in the United States. To the best of our 
knowledge, however, it has never been applied to prevent publication of such 
information74 and has not been tested in the courts. The general prohibition in 
the IT AR on exporting technical data has been upheld, however, as to informa-
tion directly and significantly related to specific articles on the Munitions List. 75 
The IT AR require prior State Department approval for presentations to 
foreigners that involve information concerning Munitions List items and the 
disclosure of technical data. 76 Further, the IT AR require that manufacturing or 
technical assistance agreements between persons in the United States and per-
sons abroad relating to items on the Munitions List be approved by the Depart-
ment of State77 and include certain conditions, such as a bar on disclosure of 
technical data to particular third countries. 78 Thus, the IT AR control the expor-
tation of "development information" under manufacturing licenses or technical 
assistance agreements when that information relates to items on the Munitions 
List or a new area of significant military capability. 
The AECA licensing process for the export of technical data has two main 
elements. First, the sensitivity of the data is evaluated by the State Department 
and the appropriate elements of the Defense Department, as well as other 
agencies when necessary because of the nature of the data involved. 79 Second, 
State reviews the proposal for consistency with U.S. foreign policy objectives. 80 
70. [d. § 125.11(8). 
71. [d. § 125.11(1). 
72. [d. 
73. [d. § 125.11(1) n.3. 
74. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
75. See United States v. Edler Industries, 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978). 
76. 22 C.F.R. § 125.03 (1983). 
77. /d. § 124.01. 
78. [d. § 124.1O(i). 
79. [d. §§ 124.02, 125.05. 
80. [d. §§ 123.05, 124.01. 
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Unlike the EAA process, no specific reference is made to the foreign availability 
of the information in question. This factor would not be determinative in a 
licensing decision under the AECA except to the extent that such availability has 
an obvious bearing on the sensitivity of the export. 
The authority of the Department of Commerce to impose export controls 
under the EAA extends only to items not controlled by other statutes. HI Where it 
is unclear whether the EAA or the AECA applies, Congress has directed the 
Commerce Department to coordinate the application of the EAA with the 
AECA.B2 Thus, there may be cases where Commerce will require the approval of 
the State Department before granting an export license. 
The State Department issued a policy statement in 1980 that was intended to 
clarify the scope of the IT AR controls on "technical data" in the context of 
cryptology.B3 Technical data was described as not including general mathemat-
ical, engineering, statistical, or other basic and theoretical ("research") informa-
tion that is not reasonably expected to have direct application to items on the 
Munitions List (i.e., "development information").84 The statement also re-
affirmed that professional and academic presentations, informal discussions, 
and equipment demonstrations that involve disclosure of "technical data" to 
foreign nationals require State Department approval.85 The policy statement 
also advised, however, that no prior approval is required for publication of 
information in the United States, within the meaning of the IT AR provisions 
authorizing a general exemption from the AECA licensing requirement, for 
information "in published form and subject to public dissemination."86 Those 
provisions were not intended, despite the explicit reference to obtaining "appro-
priate" U.S. government approval before publication, to establish a prior review 
requirement.87 
C. Atomic Energy Act 
Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act,B8 all information, whether "re-
search" or "development" in nature, that concerns the design, manufacture or 
use of atomic weapons, the production of special material, or the use of such 
material in energy production is designated as "restricted data" and therefore 
81. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416(a) (1982 & Supp. I 19R3); 15 C.F.R. § 370.IO(a) (defense materials) and 
§ 370.IO(e) (nuclear materials) (1983). 
82. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416(b) (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
83. Cryptography/Technology Data, 80 DEP'T OF STATE MUNITIONS CONTROL NEWSLETTER (1980). 
84. !d. 
85. !d. 
86. !d.; 22 C.F.R. § 125.11(1) (1983). 
87. Cryptography/Technology Data, 80 DEP'T OF STATE MUNITIONS CONTROL NEWSLETTER (1980); 22 
C.F.R. § 125.11(1) n.3 (1983). 
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982). 
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subject to the control of the Department of Energy, successor to the Atomic 
Energy Commission for these purposes. 89 Information within the restricted data 
category is "born classified" in that it is subject to government control as re-
stricted data from the moment of its development, even when the information 
has been developed entirely in the private sector. 
This broad assertion of government control over the disclosure and use of this 
particular category of information has been challenged and sustained in the 
courts. In United States v. The Progressive,90 the government obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction, which withstood subsequent review,9! against the publication of 
information concerning the construction of a hydrogen bomb. The cases were 
ultimately dismissed, at the request of the government, because similar informa-
tion published elsewhere had been widely disseminated. 
The act establishes specific controls and requirements for the export of 
restricted data. 92 Such information may only be exported pursuant to a special 
agreement for nuclear cooperation authorized by the President.93 The act also 
establishes penalties for illegal acts involving restricted data. 94 Information that 
has been declassified or removed from the restricted data category may be 
controlled under a 1982 addition to the Atomic Energy Act. 95 Proposed De-
partment of Energy regulations were published to establish these controls in 
April, 1983. Other information related to the security of nuclear facilities may be 
controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of 
Energy under provisions enacted in 1980 and 1982, respectively.96 
Unclassified information relating to the production of special nuclear material 
abroad, not authorized under an agreement for cooperation with a foreign coun-
try, may not be transferred to that country without authorization by the Depart-
ment of Energy.97 Authorization by the Department of Energy does not pre-
clude the Commerce Department from requiring a validated license for the 
export of "technical data" under the Export Administration Act.98 Finally, the 
Atomic Energy Act establishes rigorous export controls over the export of 
information defined to be "sensitive nuclear technology" in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978.99 
Thus, control may be asserted under the Atomic Energy Act over the pubJica-
89. /d. § 2014(y). 
90. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
91. Motion for reconsideration denied, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis. 1979); appeal dismissed without 
opinion, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). 
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2162, 2164 (1982). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. §§ 2272-2277 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). 
9.5. Id. § 2168 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
96. Id. §§ 2167, 2168 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
97. Id. §§ 2131-2140 (1982). 
98. /d. § 2166 (1982). 
99. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (1982). 
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tion or "export" of either "research" or "development" information that consti-
tutes restricted data. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the authority to 
review, declassify, and remove information from this category when it deter-
mines that publication would not constitute "an unreasonable risk to the com-
mon defense and security," although in some instances the concurrence of the 
Department of Defense is required. loo 
D. Invention Secrecy Act 
The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 (ISA)lOl authorizes the government to 
prevent the public dissemination, through the patent system, of information 
submitted in connection with an application for patent protection. This control is 
accomplished by the issuance of a secrecy order precluding the applicant from 
disclosing further the information in the application. 102 The authority first was 
enacted in 1917 and was limited to time of war in both its effect and duration. In 
1940, the wartime limitation was removed and the Commissioner of Patents was 
empowered to withhold the award of a patent for any period determined to be in 
the national interest. This authority was extended for the duration of World War 
II in 1942, and was made permanent in 1952. 
Information included in a patent application is kept in confidence by the 
Patent Office and is not disclosed until a patent is granted. A small staff in the 
Patent Office performs a national security review of each of the approximately 
100,000 patent applications that are filed each year. This staff is allotted six 
months for its review and for any necessary consultation with and review by the 
defense agencies. loa The staff relies for guidance in its review on the Commodity 
Control List, the Munitions Control List, and the Militarily Critical Technologies 
List, as well as general information acquired in the course of its dealings with the 
various national security and export control agencies. During the review period, 
the applicant may not seek a foreign patent for an invention made in the United 
States without a "license" from the Patent Office. l04 
The ISA does not bar publication of information by an applicant prior to filing 
a patent application, however, and a patent may be granted after publication so 
long as the application was filed prior to, or within one year of the publication 
date. los This situation obviously would negate the effectiveness of any secrecy 
order and, again, demonstrates an underlying reliance on the commercial self-
interests of the possessor of the relevant information. 
100. 42 u.S.C. § 2162(b) (1982). 
101. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1982). 
102. Id. § 181. 
103. See Rules of Practice In The Patent Office, 37 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-.23 (1983). 
104. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1982). 
105. Id. § 119. 
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The ISA establishes two categories of authority for government action. 106 
Where the government has a property interest in the subject of the patent 
application (i.e., it relates to contract or research activities funded by a govern-
ment agency), the Commissioner solicits the opinion of the funding agency and 
issues a secrecy order if notified that publication or disclosure of the information 
might be detrimental to the national security.l07 Where the government does not 
have a property interest, the advice of appropriate defense agencies is solicited 
when, in the Commissioner's opinion, disclosure might be detrimental to the 
national secu rity. I 08 If the defense agency determines that a secrecy order is 
justified, the Commissioner orders the material to be kept secret and a patent 
withheld. 109 
A patent secrecy order is issued for one year but is renewable annually if it is 
determined that the national interest requires continued nondisclosure,uo The 
applicant has the right to seek compensation from the government for damages 
related to the imposition of the secrecy order and for the government's use, if 
any, of the information in question. lll 
The number of secrecy orders issued each year is relatively small. In fiscal year 
1979, for example, 107,409 patent applications were received. Of these, 4,829 
were forwarded to the defense agencies for review. Following that review, 243 
secrecy orders were issued. Only forty-three of these involved patent applica-
tions that had not been classified for national security purposes, thereby indicat-
ing a prior governmental interest, when filed. 1l2 This authority has been re-
viewed by several courts but has not been challenged on first amendment 
grounds,u3 
E. Trading With The Enemy and International Emergency Economic Powers Acts 
Under the Trading With The Enemy Actl14 and the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act,115 commercial exports to certain destinations of informa-
tion of any nature may be controlled in times of war or national emergency. The 
Treasury Department administers these controls, some of which remain in 
effect. 
106. Id. § 181. 
107. /d. 
108. Id. 
109. ld. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. § 183. 
112. See The Government's Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on 
Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) (statement of Rene D. Tegtmeyer, Assistant 
Commissioner for Patents, Department of Commerce). 
113. See, e.g., Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958). 
114. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
115.ld. §§ 1701-1706. 
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1. Trading With The Enemy Act 
The Trading With The Enemy Act (TEA) 116 gives the President broad powers 
to control trade with foreign countries. Prior to 1977, the statute granted these 
powers "[d]uring time of war or during any other period of national emergency 
declared by the President."117 This provision was amended in 1977 to grant 
these powers only during the "time of war."IlB However, controls in place prior 
to that date may be extended annually by the President. 11 9 The relevant regula-
tions have been extended repeatedly and were last extended by President 
Reagan until September 14, 1984.120 
The TEA grants the President the authority to regulate any transactions in 
foreign exchange or credit, payments between banking institutions, and most 
other transactions involving gold or silver coin, bullion, currency, or securi-
ties. 121 He may also regulate or prohibit any transaction involving any property 
in which a designated foreign country or any of its nationals has any interest. 122 
These powers apply to transactions involving any person or any property subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States. 123 The TEA also grants the President 
broad powers over the property and interests of designated foreign countries or 
their nationals. 124 The combined effect of these authorities is to regulate all 
forms of commerce between the United States or its nationals and the designated 
"enemy" countries. 
Regulations promulgated under this statute establish a foreign assets control 
system and prohibit, unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, a variety of transactions involving specific foreign countries. 125 The coun-
tries identified under this regulation at this time are North Korea, Cambodia, 
and North and South Vietnam. 126 
A variety of transactions are prohibited if they are effected by or on behalf of a 
designated country or its nationals, or if they involve property in which such a 
country or its nationals has any direct or indirect interest. 127 In addition, unless 
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
116. See supra note 114. 
117. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(l) (1968). 
118. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § IOI(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 5(b)(I). 
(1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
119. Pub. L. No. 95-233, § IOI(b), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 5(b)(l) (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
120. Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 48 
Fed. Reg. 40,695 (1983). 
121. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(l) (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
122. /d. 
123. [d. 
124. /d. 
125. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-520.809 (1983). 
126. [d. § 500.201(d). 
127. [d. 
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may not purchase or otherwise engage in any transaction outside the United 
States involving materials originating in North Korea, Cambodia, or North and 
South Vietnam. 128 The definitions accompanying these prohibitions are drawn 
broadly.129 
The Secretary of the Treasury may authorize the transactions described above 
by issuing a general or specific license. 13o General licenses, as with the EAA, take 
the form of regulatory exemptions. 131 Other transactions not authorized by 
general license require a specific license from the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control in the Treasury Department.132 
In addition, the TEA regulations prohibit shipments to designated foreign 
countries of (a) materials on the Commerce Department's Commodity Control 
List; (b) materials whose unauthorized exportation from the United States is 
prohibited by regulations issued under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (the 
Arms Export Control Act); and (c) materials or facilities relating to atomic 
energy whose exportation from the United States is prohibited under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954.133 Unless authorized by the Secretary of the Treasu ry or his 
designee, no person within the United States may purchase or sell or arrange the 
purchase or sale of such materials in any foreign country or obtain any credit or 
payment from any banking institution in connection with any shipment of such 
materials from any foreign country directly or indirectly to Albania, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, East Germany, East Berlin, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, People's Republic of China, Po-
land and Danzig, Romania, South and North Vietnam, Tibet, and the Soviet 
Union. 134 This approval requirement is in addition to the licensing and approval 
mechanisms established under the EAA, AECA, and AEA. 
The regulations also control Cuban assets and all financial and commercial 
transactions involving Cuba, its nationals, or persons acting on their behalf.135 
The prohibitions regarding transactions involving Cu ba or its nationals are 
virtually identical to those discussed above and prohibit any person subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction from dealing in materials originating in Cuba unless licensed by 
the Secretary of the Treasu ry .136 These regulations also define "license," "gen-
eral license," and "specific license" in the same manner as described above. 137 
Although the primary focus of the TEA and its implementing regulations is 
128. [d. § 500.204. 
129. See id. § 500.301. 
130. [d. § 500.201. 
131. [d. §§ 500.505-.535, 500.563-.565. 
132. [d. §§ 500.318, 500.549-.562, 500.801. 
133. [d. § 505.10. 
134. [d. § 505.10. 
135. [d. § 515.101-.809. 
136. [d. § 515.204. 
137. [d. § 515.316-.318. 
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on currency and material transactions, the operative provisions are sufficiently 
broad so as to control a wide range of transactions involving both "development" 
and "research" information. Unlike the control mechanisms discussed earlier, 
the TEA and its regulations pay little attention to public availability or intrinsic 
value. 
2. International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)138 was enacted 
in 1977 and provides the President with broad authorities, similar to those in the 
TEA, to regulate a wide variety of commercial and banking transactions involv-
ing persons or property subject to U.S.jurisdiction. 139 These authorities may be 
used when a "national emergency," as opposed to the state of war required 
under the TEA, has been declared to deal with an "unusual and extraordinary 
threat" to U.S. national security, foreign policy, or economic interests emanating 
in whole or substantial part from abroad. 14o 
Congress must be notified when these authorities are exercised, and the 
emergency declaration terminates at the end of one year, unless renewed by the 
President. 141 This statutory authority has been invoked to impose restrictions on 
trade and currency transactions with Iran during the hostage crisis and was 
upheld by the courts in that context.142 More recently, President Reagan used 
this authority to sustain the Export Administration Regulations when the EAA 
expired in October, 1983 and February, 1984.143 
The IEEPA excludes from its terms, among other things, personal communi-
cations that do not involve a transfer of anything of value. 144 Thus, as in the 
TEA, "development" and "research" information in a commercial context by 
implication may fall within the regulatory structure created by the IEEPA. 
138. 50 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. 11983). 
139. /d. § 1702. 
140. [d. § 1701. 
141. /d. § 1703. The statute contains authority for Congress to act to end such a national emergency 
by adopting a concurrent resolution to that effect. Under Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), however. this provision represents a form of invalid legislative veto. 
142. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (an executive order involving emer-
gency authority is "supported by the strongest presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpre-
tation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it"); United States v. 
Spawr Optical Research, 685 F.2d 1076, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1875 (1983) 
(upholding presidential authority to continue controls under an executive order and the Trading With 
The Enemy Act, IEEPA's predecessor, during a lapse in the EEA); H. R. REp. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 13 ("Should a lapse [of the EAA] occur, however, the authority of Title II of [IEEPA] could be 
used to continue the Export Administration Regulations in effect if, and to the extent that, the 
President declared a national emergency .... ") (referring to H.R. 7738). 
143. See supra note 21. 
144. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
There exists a large, complex, and ambiguous body of statutes and regulations 
that govern, or have the potential for governing, the export of various types of 
technical information in many circumstances. These controls are based on the 
nature of the information to be exported, its destination, and its practical 
application. Attorneys advising clients in trade matters should be aware of these 
authorities and alert for issues in these areas. To be content to focus on exports 
of hardware, products, or equipment is to risk damaging consequences for both 
the country and the client. 
